主讲人:李 戎
时间:2021年6月11日14:30-16:30
地点:武汉大学经济与管理学院B129
主持人:刘 岩,武汉大学经济发展研究中心宏观经济研究所所长,副教授
主办单位:武汉大学经济发展研究中心、《经济评论》编辑部
执行单位:武汉大学发展经济学研究生会
内容简介:Oates (1972) argues that local governments cannot use conventional policies to stabilize economies, due to fiscal spillovers and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. In contrast, Hayek’s theory implies it is efficient for a central government to devolve decision-making authority to local governments that have informational advantages. This paper tests the conflicting theoretical implications by examining a natural experiment caused by the income-tax-sharing reform in China. Our analysis reveals that local government size does have a stabilizing effect, but verticalfiscal imbalance (VFI) substantially weakens this stabilizing effect; lack of local information is the key factor leading to this influence of VFI.